The Eagle and Simurgh: A Surviving Rome and Persia

[Longclaw16]

"'My Khosrow, listen well. I took the Indus Multan and Taxila's riches, beyond even Sekandar… Yemen and Khoresan are ours. I built Ctesiphon's splendor. Yet Ahura Mazda's truest gift was peace with Rome. We crave their Antioch, their Alexandria, but war destroys. Be the first Persian king to make friends, allies of Rome. We must share the world with them. It is ordained by the divine.'"
-Khosrow I Anushirvan-
"When the world ends and the light of the sun readies to snuff out forever, the last Roman and last Persian will lift their heads to gaze at each other… I do not know whether they'd embrace as brothers or draw swords and rush towards each other with murder in their eyes. Each is equally likely."
-Russian Tsar Vasily V circa AUC MMCDXCVIII-
​

The Fickle Fate of Destiny

Khosrow I Anushirivan "the immortal soul", casts a long shadow even to this day. Persians see him as a near mythical hero, the Arabian and Serican schools a great ruler, and the Roman a wise ruler and later the great savior. But upon his ascension in 531 AD he was but a 19 year old young man. Smart but untested, threatened on all sides by his older brothers and the Mazdakite sect, fear of continued war with the Roman Empire under Justinian I led him to conclude the Eternal Peace, buying him time and significant treasure in tribute payments from the Romans.

Did he enter this peace knowing he'd break it in the near future when he was more secure? Contemporary Roman sources such as Procopius say yes, while the Persian historians and the Arab history of Ibn Ishaq suggest otherwise. Whatever the truth, the decision of Khosrow to respect the peace through all the turmoil of Justinian's middle reign ultimately proved his defining legacy that all would later recognize saved both the Roman and Sassanid empires.

Again, the historians differ as to why Khosrow pivoted not west, but east, though all agree that he began setting his sights on the Indus Valley even before the Eternal Peace was formalized. Procopius and Petrus Patricius both claim that Belisarius's defeat of the Sassanids at Dara and Callinicum caused Khosrow to deem Rome's eastern provinces not worth the trouble. Persian and Arab sources disagree, stating that Khosrow's decision stemmed from the Gupta Empire's fragmentation into smaller kingdoms after Huna invasions, leaving the Indus Valley politically unstable and ripe for conquest.

The most famous of these many reasons comes from the Shahnameh of Cyrus II, which as most know details the so-called Vision of Anushirivan. Fond of astrology, Khosrow before the Eternal Peace was formalized was shaken by a particularly bad series of stellar readings by his magi. Going to bed, a restless night found him awakening after a great prophetic dream. Cyrus records that it was of a great darkness emerging in the west, enveloping all before a motionless Khosrow, only beaten back by a radiant eastern horizon anchored by a river of light beyond the mountains. When the light reached Khosrow, the Shahanshah found himself transforming into a Simurgh, the mythical bird representing Persia itself. Khosrow, profoundly shaken, traveled to the fire temple of Adur Gushnasp in Daylam to seek interpretation of this dream, to which the mawbed there proclaimed to him that great danger that could destroy Persia dwelt in the west, while salvation rested in the east.

No contemporary source verifies Cyrus' tale, though records from Adur Gushnap do say Khosrow visited there around the time Cyrus claims.

Regardless, be it fear of Rome, opportunity in India, or Khosrow's version of Constantine's vision at the Milvian Bridge, Khosrow by 533 was convinced that Ahura Mazda intended him to forgo war with Rome and instead conquer the Indus Valley. A decision that would resonate to the present day.

Opening moves in Khorasan

Khosrow I's decision in the beginning of his reign to launch an expedition toward the Indus River domains in 533 AD required careful planning to overcome the challenges of a neglected eastern frontier, a neglect centuries in the making from both geographical disadvantage and purposeful choices. The Sasanian defeat under Peroz I against the Hephthalites (White Huns) in 484 had left the region unstable, with Sasanian control weakened and the Hephthalites still a looming threat. For Kavad I, Khosrow's father, it seemed easier to war with the Romans given that Syria and Armenia were both far closer to the Sassanid capital at Ctesiphon and other logistics bases. To mount a successful campaign in the east, Khosrow needed to address military readiness, logistical coordination, diplomatic maneuvering, and regional intelligence.

His first decision, showing an intelligence and foresight well beyond his 20 years in age, concerned the capital itself. Ctesiphon was the largest city between Constantinople and Tang China, the premier central administrative hub of the Sassanid Empire. Yet it was also west of the Zagros mountains, hampering any sort of communication with the eastern empire. Khosrow wanted an eastern capital from which he could coordinate his campaigns without needing the disruption of the Zagros passes.

Many were considered, from Merv to Nishapur to Ray, but Khosrow chose Esfahan.

Once called Ecbatana - the former capital of the Median Empire in Cyrus I's day - provided a strategic position - elevated, defensible, and well-watered - makes it a strong candidate over alternatives like Ray or Nishapur. It was far enough east to serve the campaign yet accessible from Ctesiphon, bridging the empire's halves. The city was also a well-established administrative zone already and when Khosrow moved his court there in summer 532, he needn't have waited much before making his preparations.

The eastern frontier's neglect since Peroz's disastrous loss - where he and much of his army perished - meant Khosrow would need to revitalize his forces. The aswaran (Sasanian heavy cavalry) were bolstered with fresh recruits from the nobility and equipped with improved armor and lances. Infantry and siege units would also be critical for tackling fortified towns along the Indus. To bolster numbers, he began conscripting the dehqani (landed gentry) and their retainers, while integrating skilled mercenaries from among the Daylamites and Alans.

Esfahan was perfect for this, sitting on the Iranian Plateau, closer to Khorasan and the routes toward the Indus, reducing the travel time to the eastern satrapies. For example, the march from Ctesiphon to Merv (a key eastern staging point) spanned over 200 parasang (1,200 kilometers) through rugged terrain, while Esfahan cut that distance by a third, easing the strain on supply lines. In addition, its location near fertile plains and water sources (like the Zayandeh Rud river) made it a natural base for stockpiling grain, weapons, and fodder. Pre-positioning resources there for the eastern campaign streamlined Khosrow's logistics, avoiding the bottlenecks of funneling everything through Ctesiphon and the Zagros passes.

Invading the Indus required a long march from Ctesiphon through Khorasan and into Bactria and Gondhara, a route plagued by arid stretches, mountain passes, and hostile tribes. The key cities of Merv, Nishapur, and Herat, which had been Sasanian strongholds before Peroz's defeat, were used as forward operating bases. Camels and mules were essential for transport, given the terrain, while Khosrow's officials repaired and expanded irrigation systems along the route to sustain garrisons and ensure water access, learning from Peroz's logistical failures against the Hephthalites.

The biggest danger posed were the Hephthalites themselves, who dominated the region between Persia and the Indus after defeating Peroz. Khosrow couldn't afford a two-front war or a repeat of 484, and so attempted to negotiate with them. The Shahnameh and other Persian historians denied this happened, claiming Khosrow's initial envoys were killed by the trecherous White Huns, but Procopius and Nikephorus Chonus assert negotiations spanned several months - Khosrow leveraging the tribute gained from Rome in 532 to buy Hephthalite neutrality or even an alliance, offering them a share of Indus spoils if they provided troops.

All sources agree that talks ultimately collapsed, both sides mobilizing for war by March 534. The King of the Hephtalites, unnamed in Persian sources but known from Tang records as Yandai Yilituo, was not a strong King and his inclinations towards peace were overruled by the will of his chiefs for war and plunder against the Persians. They were still seen as weak from Peroz's defeat, and in a nomadic confederation of mounted archers and light cavalry the will of the chieftains mattered more than that of the King.

Khosrow, by all accounts, did not see war as some sort of easy campaign. Sasanian centralization and strength hadn't helped his grandfather, who was defeated in 484 through mobility, feigned retreats, and terrain traps. Khosrow, a shrewd tactician alongside his second-in-command Spahbad Mihrmāh-rōy - a veteran of the Iberian War with Rome and of the House of Suren - planned to leverage Hephthalite overconfidence and deliver a rapid, crushing blow to avoid a prolonged war that could derail his eastern ambitions.

Khosrow, wishing to avoid repeating Peroz's mistake of being lured into open steppe or mountainous defiles where Hephthalite mobility reigned supreme, instead selected a battlefield near the fortified city of Merv. It held adjacent plains and irrigation canals, which could be used to disrupt Hephthalite cavalry charges, channeling them into kill zones. By anchoring one flank against the city walls, he intended to limit their ability to envelop his forces, forcing a frontal engagement where Sasanian discipline could shine.

The army Khosrow and Mihrmah-roy eventually deployed was smaller than he wished, taking only the veterans rather than the recruits training in Esfahan. It was a balanced army of 20,000: the aswaran cataphract core of 4,000, an infantry screen of mostly Daylamites double that, 2,000 Persian foot archers, and light cavalry of mixed Khorasani, Alan, Bactrian, and Arab horsemen to make up the rest. He also brought a core of thirty Indian elephants, trained to break horsemen. Such was the force he led against the 15,000 mounted archers and lancers of the White Huns, secured at Merv by May 533.

The battle was described in detail by Nikephorus Chonas, Yazdegerd al-Tabari, and Cyrus II, without much difference between them. The Hephthalites, emboldened by past victories, charged in with waves of horse-archers, peppering Khosrow's infantry screen commanded by one Boe of the House of Varaz (based in Khorasan). This center held, shield wall anchored against Merv's walls and bolstered by the foot archers who outranged the Hephthalite horse archers. The elephants were deployed to the center, unfamiliar to the Hephthalite horses and thus scattering them. His light cavalry under Mihrmah-roy skirmished on the wings, feigning weakness upon the first sustained push against them.

As the Hephthalites committed to a pursuit, Khosrow signaled the trap. The "retreating" cavalry wheeled back, while the aswarans burst from concealed positions led by Khosrow personally. More foot archers unleashed a volley from the fortified heights near the city. The Hephthalite line buckled under the pincer and were crushed by the heavily armored aswarans. Their khan fell to a lance thrust - Cyrus II saying it was Khosrow himself delivering the killing blow - chaos erupting. Khosrow's heavy cavalry drove the rout, cutting down fleeing riders, while infantry mopped up stragglers.

It was the decisive win Khosrow needed, killing 5,000 Hephthalites and scattering the rest. It crippled their ability to make war against the Persians, while captured loot and horses would pay for the cost of the war and more beyond. The Hephthalites weren't fully united, owing to their tribal structure, so many survivors as well as uncommitted chiefs submitted to Khosrow as vassals - sending gifts and cavalry for his army.

The campaign, which could've lasted over a year but wrapped up in weeks, let Khosrow pivot to the Indus, his reputation as a victorious Shahanshah cemented.

And it wasn't just the Persian nobility and populace that noticed.

 

[Thiccc Shaedy]

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